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in that, like the introduction, it does not report or discuss the findings of the 
chapters in the volume, but is based on other sources. Thus it states that in 
the January 2006 gas crisis involving initially Russia and Ukraine, 'commercial 
factors were reportedly at the root of the problem' which was 'subsequentiy 
politicized' (p. 294). This ignores the research by Fantini in the same volume, 
which comes to the conclusion that Gazprom's desire for higher prices 
might be justified commercially, but the fact that Belarus was being offered 
gas more cheaply suggested a geopolitical motivation. The point is that the 
whole Russian pricing system for gas had been inherendy geopolitical from 
Soviet times onwards, but Russia in the 2000s was moving from a policy of 
subsidizing all its neighbours, for geopolitical reasons, to a policy of charging 
its friends less than its enemies. Polikanov, on the other hand, goes too far in 
arguing that Gazprom is simply a tool of Russian foreign policy; it has its own 
interests, both as a commercial organization and as part of the Russian state. 
These questions about the politicization of energy supply are complex and 
deserve deeper research than is shown in the volumes under review. 
Since these books were published, the world financial crisis has arrived and 
the price of oil and gas has been falling rapidly. It is by no means clear, how 
ever, that the relative decline in Russia's wealth will in itself lead it to play a 
more restrained role. On the other hand, it is possible that Barack Obama's 
presidency may have a positive effect on international relations globally, and 
facilitate a more cooperative climate to which Russia will contribute. 
UCL SSEES Peter J. S. Duncan 
Hale, Henry E. Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2007. xi + 275 
pp. Maps. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?15.95: $29.99. 
The single weak element in this magisterial book is its title 
? somewhat 
redundant in an era when United Russia dwarfs all other contenders, and 
when Russian federalism is a distant memory. Analysing Russian politics is 
like chasing a moving train at the best of times, and this title reflects research 
largely conducted prior to 2003 (albeit with a few observations made up to 
2005). But an obsolete tide aside, the substance of Henry E. Hale's detailed, 
scrupulously researched and engagingly written study is likely to be consulted 
for a long time to come. It makes key empirical and theoretical contributions 
to the study of Russian politics from a wide range of sources (particularly in 
Chapter i's excellent literature review, with a good discussion of previous 
approaches to understanding Russian party weakness and a succinct summary 
of why parties remain vital in solving collective action problems). 
Hale's central concern is why political parties long failed to fully penetrate 
the Russian polity. He finds his answer by looking at Russia as an 'electoral 
market' and focusing, above all, on the 'supply and demand' of party products 
in this market, and the potential availability of 'party substitutes' that might 
prove more attractive to candidates and voters (p. 19). Rather than being some 
mechanistic application of a rational choice model, the 'electoral market' 
approach focuses illuminatingly on why candidates decide to run for office on 
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party labels rather than as independents or as members of 'party substitutes' 
(in Russia, principally regional governors' machines, and 'politicised financial 
industrial groups'), and why voters might respond to party labels rather than 
the more clientelistic appeals of such party substitutes. Hale argues that in 
Russia, the strong executive 'superpresidency' consistentiy tilts the electoral 
market in favour of party substitutes. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed and wide-ranging discussion of national 
party development from 1989 to 2005, referencing many now half-forgotten 
party failures, and argues that those which were most successful started with 
significant political capital (usually via the 'patrimonial communist' [repressive 
and patronage-based] legacy or continued ties to the state) and which 
adopted campaign and party-building strategies which developed this capital. 
Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive and rich analysis (relying on voter atti 
tude surveys and quantitative analysis of national, gubernatorial and regional 
legislative party nomination strategies) to dissect the degree to which Russia 
has become a party system. Hale presents a nuanced picture, demonstrating 
neither party strength nor weakness, but identifies a significant increase in 
partisan influence throughout the 1990s (e.g. in the State Duma, voter identi 
fication with parties and parties' role in candidate nomination) combined 
with huge gaps in the party penetration of the polity (e.g. in party influence 
over federal and regional executives). However, earlier development had 
largely 'stalled' by the Putin era, with all parties bar United Russia atrophying. 
Chapter 4 provides the explanation: that candidates consistendy had major 
incentives to run with party substitutes which 'crowded out' genuine parties 
in presidential and parliamentary elections and which 'decimated' them in 
elections for governorships and provincial legislatures (p. 195). 
Hale consistently argues that party substitutes exist in all political systems, 
but it is their dominance over parties which is unusual in Russia. After point 
ing to their origins in Soviet political economy and the marketization process, 
in Chapter 5 he analyses how the executive branch was key in maintaining 
this dominance. Nothing about 'party substitutes' means they cannot become 
proto-parties (as with the emergence of the US Democratic Party). However, 
before 1999, the presidential administration consistendy undermined such 
tendencies until 'scared straight' by the emergence of the anti-Kremlin 
Fatherland-All Russia bloc into realizing it needed a national party machine 
of its own to maintain power (p. 228). Thus Hale traces Putin's 'party 
building' efforts (including a new Law on Political Parties, the introduction 
of proportional representation at regional legislative level and above all the 
increasing patronage of United Russia) direcdy to the Kremlin's survival 
instincts, and not to any altruistic realization that parties might help Russia's 
stability or governance. There are some interesting comparative observations 
in the conclusion that Hale invites us to research. Principally, he posits that 
weaker party systems are likely to emerge either from formerly patrimonial 
Communist countries or those combining federalism with a powerful central 
presidency (which, thereby and contrary to expectations, increase national 
?founity). The key motif throughout is that a powerful, legacy-aided presi 
dency has been the driving force behind the development and defects of 
Russia's party system alike. At the time of writing, Hale remained open 
minded that Kremlin-inspired party-building might inspire some future 
cyclical counter-mobilization and opposition electoral contestation. In the 
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aftermath of the 2007-08 elections it is clear that mobilizing the political elite 
and monopolizing the opposition can go hand-in-hand. Nevertheless, Hale's 
central theses are likely to stand the test of time, and this rich volume will 
remain pivotal for understanding Russian politics, perhaps even after Putin 
himself no longer remains so. 
Politics and International Relations 
University of Edinburgh 
Luke March 
Wood, Tony. Chechnya: The Case for Independence. Verso, London and New York, 
2007. 199 pp. Map. Notes. Appendix. Glossary. Index. ?12.99 (paper 
back). 
On first viewing, I was intrigued by the tide of this book and the relevant 
meaning of it. Having not yet read beyond the tide, Tony Wood, I thought, 
was going to make a case for contemporary Chechen independence as a 
sovereign state after Russia's two mass military invasions of that region and 
the incipient chaos created. But who, I wondered, was going to be the 'jury' 
for this, as implied by the judicial terminology of making a case? Would he 
be making a case, or impassioned plea, to the Russian government and/or 
people to free Chechnya, and allow some form of self-determination, or was 
Wood going to make a case for duly-designated 'international power brokers', 
even though the politicians of world powers are not in command of what 
the Russian military does or does not do outside of indirect influences? 
Alternatively, is he going to lose any basis on which he would be making some 
type of case, turning such an effort into merely an anti-Russian indictment, 
projected at the world-at-large? 
After reading the book, it is clear that the third option is the chosen one, 
directed generally at an undefined 'international community'. This comes as 
a disappointment, as he begins and ends the book with making a reasoned 
legal and moral 'case' against the war, but ultimately setties into an anti 
Russian track that few Russians would accept or sympathize with. Further 
more, it can be noted that such advice made to the 'international community' 
in this respect, basically towards no one in particular, is rarely, if ever, 
heeded. 
Citing heavily from Moshe Gammer's recent book The Lone Wolf and the Bear 
(London, 2006), and from other academics such as John Dunlop, Wood 
argues that criticism of Russia over its Chechen policies has been insufficient, 
and that the international community has forgotten that the Chechen conflict 
is predominandy a war for separation of Chechnya from Russia, and not some 
blind Islamic assault on Western values, as Vladimir Putin sought to portray 
it. 
The results of Wood's 'case' are somewhat mixed. Overlooking the role of 
the recent Chechen wars in the greater context of Russia's history with the 
region, Wood seeks to argue that Chechnya is vasdy more of a failed state 
because of Russia's wars to quash the Chechen independence movements. 
However, it can be counter-argued that 1) Chechnya was never stable, and 
would only become stable relative to the stability and actions of its larger 
neighbour(s), and that 2) alternative arguments and interpretations should be 
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